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In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that 
ordinary objects  (artefacts,  animals,  persons,  etc.)  are  instantaneous  and ‘persist’ by 
being suitably related to other instantaneous objects (see T. Sider 1996, 2001 and K. 
Hawley 2001, both defenders of the view). In this paper I focus on the issue of what 
stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ 
or ‘London’. This is how I will proceed: after discussing the general features of stage 
theory (section 1), I will consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about 
the semantics of proper names (section 2). I will then point to some hitherto unnoticed 
problems for the view that emerges from those remarks (section 3), and finally offer an 
alternative view, which I take to be the best option available to stage theorists (section 
4). 
1. Stage theory: background assumptions and theoretical resources. 
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Stage theory is usually presented under two broad ontological assumptions. The first is 
eternalism, the view that merely past and merely future objects are as real as present 
objects:  Socrates  and  our  future  grandchildren  exist  in  the  same  way  as  we  do  – 
temporal distance is no more ontologically significant than spatial distance. (Eternalism 
implies the rejection of presentism, the view that nothing exists which is not present). 
The  second  broad  ontological  assumption  is  four-dimensionalism,  the  thesis  that, 
necessarily, every spatiotemporal object has a  temporal part at each time at which it 
exists. Against this ontological background, the characteristic thesis of stage theory is 
that,  among  the  many  entities  that  populate  our  four-dimensional  world,  ordinary 
objects are best identified with instantaneous stages. In Sider’s own words, stage theory 
is  the  view that  ‘the  referents  of  ordinary  terms,  members  of  ordinary  domains  of 
quantification,  subjects  of  ordinary  predication,  and  so  on’ are  stages.2 This  view 
contrasts  with  perdurance  theory (also called  ‘the  worm view’),  the  alternative  and 
more traditional four-dimensionalist view according to which ordinary objects are best 
identified with relatively long-lived sums of stages, i.e. ‘worms’. It is worth mentioning 
that stage and perdurance theory may also be combined into different 'mixed views', on 
which  ordinary  speech  is  best  interpreted  as  being  sometimes  about  stages  and 
sometimes  about  worms.  It  is  one  of  these  mixed views  that  Sider  (2001)  actually 
defends.3
Perdurantists and stage theorists disagree not only about what ordinary objects are but 
also about the proper analysis of temporal predication. Perdurantists typically favour an 
analysis of temporal predication in terms of temporal parts: roughly, x was F iff x has a 
2 Sider (2001), p. 60-61. Here and hereafter, by ‘stage’ I will mean instantaneous stage.
3 See Sider (2001), p. 197. I will  come back to this feature of Sider’s view in section 4.4.  
Meanwhile, for ease of exposition I will disregard this complication and discuss Sider as if he 
were advocating a  pure version of stage theory. This of course does not affect the arguments 
presented.
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past temporal part that is  F simpliciter.  Stage theorists, on the other hand, generally 
adopt a counterpart-theoretic account according to which an object x was F iff x has a 
temporal  counterpart  in  the  past  which  is  F simpliciter.  The  role  that  temporal 
counterparts play in this analysis is thus analogous to the role that modal counterparts 
play in the more familiar counterpart-theoretic analysis of modal claims. Just as happens  
in the modal case, there are different temporal counterpart relations that are relevant for 
evaluating different temporal claims. Most ordinary temporal claims are evaluated by 
using  counterpart  relations  that  are  associated  with  the  ‘persistence  conditions’ of 
ordinary  kinds  of  things.  So  for  instance  ‘this  statue  will  be  F’ will  generally  be 
evaluated  using  a  counterpart  relation  associated  with  the  persistence  conditions  of 
statues,  whereas ‘this piece of clay will  be  F’ will  be evaluated using a counterpart 
relation associated with the persistence conditions of pieces of clay. As a result,  the 
stages related by most usual temporal counterpart relations are also causally related in 
different  ways  –  unlike,  of  course,  the  case  of   modal  counterparts.  In  fact,  the 
counterpart relations invoked by the stage theorist in her evaluation of temporal claims 
are exactly the same as the ones that the perdurantist uses to single out those worms that 
are identified with ordinary objects: persons, statues, pieces of clay, etc. That is to say, 
the things that a stage theorist typically regards as counterparts of Socrates are just those 
things which the perdurantist regards as Socrates’ temporal parts. 
It is worth emphasizing that stage theorists present their disagreement with perdurantists 
as being ‘merely semantic’ rather than ontological.4 They claim not to disagree about 
what objects there are in the world – only about which of those objects are properly 
identified with ordinary objects. It is for this reason that semantic considerations like 
those I will raise in this paper are highly relevant for a correct assessment of the view.
4 Although see Parsons (2004), p. 190 for an alternative take on this.
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2. Sider's semantics for proper names: the qualified present-stage view.
We can now address the question of what stage theorists should say about the semantics 
of ordinary proper names. In this section, I will discuss what stage theorists actually say 
about this issue, focusing mostly on the presentation of Ted Sider (1996, 2001).5
On the account offered by Sider, ordinary proper names have two radically different 
roles. In some cases, which Sider calls ‘de re temporal predications’, proper names are 
used to single out a presently existing stage and express a singular proposition about it.  
In some other cases, they are used to express a ‘general proposition’ about what was or 
will be the case at some non-present time. This double role assigned to proper names – 
which  I  explain  further  below –  is  precisely  the  feature  of  the  account  that  I  find 
unappealing, for reasons that will soon become apparent. 
Let us start by considering the first of the two uses attributed to ordinary names, that of 
referring to ordinary objects. This is, according to Sider, what ‘Obama’ does in present 
utterances of (1) and (2):
(1) Obama is president
5 In his unpublished paper “Beyond the Humphrey Objection”,  Sider presents an alternative 
account  of  reference  and  predication  that,  although  compatible  with  temporal  counterpart  
theory, is arguably a departure from stage theory: on this view stages are not, by and large, the  
referents of ordinary names and the things quantified over in ordinary talk. I cannot undertake 
here an assessment of this alternative account and the reasons that motivate Sider’s introduction 
of it (which are in any case independent of the problems that I will raise). The positive view I 
present in the last part of this paper is intended to suit stage theory, i.e. the view that stages are  
the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, and subjects of  
ordinary predication.
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(2) Obama was a senator.
Sider’s view is that in both (1) and (2), ‘Obama’ refers to a presently existing stage, of  
which (1) says that it is president, and (2) says that it was a senator. As explained above, 
the referent of ‘Obama’ can have this ‘temporal property’ in virtue of having a relevant 
counterpart in the past which is a senator simpliciter. This is how Sider himself makes 
the point: 
The simplest case is a present tense assertion about a presently existing object,  
for example, ‘Clinton is president’. One could take this sentence to express a 
so-called  “singular  proposition”  about  Clinton’s  present  stage.  Likewise  for 
what I will call “de re temporal predications”, which occur when we single out 
a presently existing stage  and assert  something about what  will  happen, or 
what has happened, to it. If I say “Clinton was once governor of Arkansas”, we 
may take this as having subject-predicate form (the predicate is complex and 
involves a temporal operator); it expresses a singular proposition about Clinton, 
to the effect that he has the temporal  property  previously being governor of  
Arkansas.6
What I want to emphasize about this quotation is that it shows a certain bias towards the 
present: for Sider, utterances of  both (1)  and (2) should be understood as expressing 
singular propositions about a presently existing stage.7 That is to say, an utterance of (2) 
should not be understood as asserting something directly about a past stage. A past stage 
6 Sider (1996), p. 449-450, emphasis added. 
7 Here  and elsewhere,  by  ‘presently  existing  stage’ I  mean  a  stage  existing  at  the  time  of 
utterance. Since utterances take more than one instant to be made, some idealization is needed  
in order to take instants as times of utterance. See Hawley (2001) p. 57 for a discussion of this 
issue.
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may enter into the story of how (2) is true, but it does not do so in virtue of being the 
referent of ‘Obama’. The referent of ‘Obama’ in (2) is a present stage, just as it is in (1).
I will soon come back to this privileged status given to present stages as objects of 
reference, but before I do so I want to address a related issue. So far, we have seen that  
the referent of an utterance of ‘Obama’ is a stage that is present at the time of utterance.  
But which of the many stages that are then present is the one to which reference is being 
made? In other words, in virtue of which mechanisms does each utterance of ‘Obama’ 
refer to the particular stage that it does refer to? Sider’s account, following Kripke, is 
roughly as follows (see Sider 1996, p. 449): a name is introduced in an initial baptism. 
In normal cases, that baptism determines what the referent of the name will be at any 
later  time:  it  will  be  the  stage  existing  at  that  later  time  that  bears  the  relevant 
counterpart  relation  to  the  originally  baptized  stage.  The  precise  way in  which  the 
baptism  determines  future  reference  is  captured  by  a  certain  individual  concept 
associated  with  the  name.  A  stage  satisfies  the  individual  concept  associated  to 
‘Obama’,  for instance,  if and only if it  bears the relevant counterpart relation to the 
stage originally baptized with the name ‘Obama’. Following Sider, we may call these 
stages ‘Obama-stages’. Now we are in a position to offer the following answer to the 
question posed above: among the many stages present at the time of utterance, ‘Obama’ 
will  refer  to  the  then  present Obama-stage  –  i.e.,  the  stage  present at  the  time  of 
utterance that bears the relevant counterpart relation to the stage originally baptized with  
the name. I will call this view the present-stage view (PSV, for short).
Sider’s individual concepts determine partial functions from times to stages such that 
each time t is assigned a stage that exists at t. Although Sider is not completely explicit 
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about the exact role of these functions in the semantic interpretation of names,  it  is 
natural to assimilate them to Kaplanian characters – i.e. to take them as functions from 
contexts to contents that capture the way in which the semantic value of a linguistic 
expression depends on the context of utterance.8 Thus, a name like ‘Obama’ turns out to 
be  a  context-dependent  expression  that  ‘names’  different  objects  when  uttered  in 
different contexts. In this respect, ‘Obama’ works much like indexicals such as ‘here’, 
‘now’, ‘I’, etc. Now, as we have seen above, on PSV present objects have a privileged 
status as objects  of reference.  Thus, the character associated with ‘Obama’ could be 
captured by something like the following semantic rule: an utterance of ‘Obama’ at  t 
refers to the Obama-stage that is present at t. 
PSV nicely explains how one and the same name can be used at different times to talk 
about the different stages existing at those times – an alleged fact about proper names 
that is also highlighted by Hawley (2001, p. 61-2). However, as Sider notes, PSV cannot 
be  the  whole  truth about  ordinary proper  names,  for  two reasons.  First,  we have  a 
problem with ‘merely past’ and ‘merely future’ objects. If proper names always refer to 
some present  stage,  what  explains  the  truth  of  ‘Socrates  was  bent-shaped  at  t1’?  A 
second problem has to do with specificity  intuitions: even if  we could refer to past 
stages, it seems implausible to suppose that there is one distinguished stage which we 
are referring to when we say ‘Socrates was wise’. Intuitively, this sentence is not about 
one particular instant in Socrates’ lifespan but rather about some past time or another, 
including extended intervals. It is in order to solve these two problems that Sider moves 
from PSV to a qualified version of it. This qualification involves the idea that ordinary 
8 However, unlike Kaplanian characters for indexicals, individual concepts are not supposed to 
be mastered  by competent  speakers.  Thanks  to  an anonymous  referee  for pointing  out  this 
difference.
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proper  names  play  two  radically  different  roles,  as  mentioned  above:  when  proper 
names cannot be plausibly understood as referring to  presently existing stages,  they 
should  be  understood  as  making  a  different  kind  of  contribution  to  the  proposition 
expressed, which is a general proposition rather than a singular one. In Sider’s terms, a 
problematic  sentence like ‘Socrates was wise’ should not be understood as a ‘de re 
temporal predication’ about a particular stage but rather as a de dicto temporal claim: 
syntactically, the sentence should be taken as the result of applying a sentential 
operator ‘WAS’ to the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’; the resulting sentence means 
that at some point in the past, there is a Socrates-stage that is wise (Sider, 1996, 
p. 450).  
The qualified PSV is then the view that a proper name works semantically as PSV states, 
except when there is no present stage for the name to refer to, in which case the name 
must  be  taken  as  a  predicate  rather  than  as  a  genuine  referring  expression.  This 
qualification  helps  to  solve  the  two problems at  hand,  but  it  also  has  some highly 
unintuitive consequences on its own. In what follows, I discuss these consequences and 
present what I take to be the best alternative to PSV available to stage theorists. 
3. A problem for the qualified present-stage view. 
Here is what I take to be the main problem in the qualified PSV. The view is committed 
to giving a differential treatment to the sentences in each of the following pairs: 
(3) Obama was bent-shaped at t1.
(4) Socrates was bent-shaped at t2.
8
(5) Obama was wise.
(6) Socrates was wise.
On the  qualified PSV, the first sentence of each pair expresses a singular proposition 
about  a particular  person, whereas the second expresses a general proposition about 
what was the case. But this is suspicious. Notice that the alleged reason why ‘Socrates’ 
and ‘Obama’ make such radically different contributions to the propositions expressed 
by our present utterances of (3) and (4) is simply that,  intuitively, Obama presently 
exists whereas Socrates has already died (or, as the stage theorist would put it: that there 
exists a present stage that satisfies the individual concept associated to ‘Obama’, but not 
a  present  stage  that  satisfies  the  concept  associated  to  ‘Socrates’).  But  it  seems 
implausible  that  this  extra-linguistic  difference  could  be  responsible  for  the  alleged 
difference in the nature of the proposition expressed. To dramatize this point, consider 
the following: on the view under consideration, it  turns out that Socrates’ death is a  
landmark in time from which the propositions expressed by utterances of (4) and (6) 
automatically changed their structure. Before Socrates’ death, Plato was able to speak 
about ‘him’ using the name ‘Socrates’ in utterances of sentences just like (4) and (6).  
Those utterances expressed singular propositions of which the then-present Socrates-
stage was a constituent. However, after Socrates’ death, Plato’s new utterances of (4) 
and (6) became unable to express those singular propositions. At that time, they could 
only express a general proposition to the effect that a certain property was instantiated 
in  the  past.  But  why  should  Socrates’  death  have  such  a  drastic  effect  on  the 
propositions expressed by Plato’s different utterances? The reason cannot be that after 
Socrates’ death the Socrates-stages are no longer available as objects of reference. This 
is  a  motivation  that  presentists could  have.  But  stage  theorists  typically  favour 
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eternalism over presentism and therefore admit that the many Socrates-stages exist in 
the relevant sense after Socrates’ death and are then available as objects of reference. 
However, Sider’s idea that utterances about past objects should be treated as  de dicto 
rather than de re is inspired by Prior’s presentist treatment of sentences seemingly about 
non-present objects. (Sider, 1996, p. 450). So it is useful to compare the consequences 
of Sider’s account with how things look for presentists. According to presentism, there 
cannot be singular propositions about past objects for the very simple reason that there 
are no past objects. Thus, unless presentists are ready to reject singular propositions 
about present objects as well,  they are also drawn to the conclusion that our present 
utterances of (3) and (4) express propositions of different kinds: whereas (3) expresses a 
singular proposition about Obama, (4) expresses a general proposition about how things 
were.  I  think  this  is  a  serious  problem for  presentists  as  well.  But  in  the  case  of 
presentists,  the  problem is  a  seemingly  unavoidable  consequence  of  their  proposed 
ontology. Not so for the stage theorist, who thinks that past stages exist as much as 
present stages do. There is no ontological reason why the stage theorist should follow 
the  presentist  lead  in  treating  sentences  as  de  dicto just  because  they  concern  past 
individuals. Sider’s insistence that ‘we clearly need the de dicto analysis for sentences 
concerning past individuals’9 does not square well with his assumption that eternalism is 
true: if non-present objects exist and belong to our ordinary domains of quantification, 
why cannot they also be the referents of ordinary terms and the constituents of singular 
propositions? The view that I will offer in the next section, unlike PSV and the qualified 
version of it, takes full advantage of eternalism in allowing proper names to have non-
present referents.
9 Sider (1996, p. 451).
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Let me clarify my complaint  that an extra-linguistic fact like Socrates’ death cannot 
affect the meaning of (4) and (6). I am assuming, like Sider in the relevant passages,  
that  sentences  express  ‘structured  propositions’ –  the  structure  of  which  somehow 
reflects the kind of contribution made by each component of the sentence. What I find 
objectionable is not that changes in the world affect which proposition is expressed by a 
given  sentence;  it  is  an  unremarkable  fact,  for  instance,  that  which  proposition  is 
expressed by an utterance of ‘Obama spoke an hour ago’ is something that varies as a 
result of what time it is. But it would be surprising if the passage of time also affected  
the  structure of the proposition expressed and the  kind of contribution made by each 
expression in the sentence. It is this second type of variation that is required by Sider’s 
(and the presentists’) semantics for proper names. 
4. The best alternative for stage theorists: the baptized-stage view.
In face of these difficulties, I suggest we reject the view that proper names play two 
different  roles  and,  in  particular,  that  ‘Obama’ and  ‘Socrates’ work  in  completely 
different ways in our present (but not future!) utterances of (5) and (6). What to do? 
What we need is a uniform treatment of sentences (3)/(4) and (5)/(6), and we seem to 
have  two obvious  options  before  us:  we could say  that  proper  names  always refer 
(allowing them to refer to past and future stages), or we could go the other way and say 
that proper names  never refer and that they always make a contribution to a general 
proposition. This second option is prima facie unattractive for stage theorists, since it 
seems incompatible with the letter and spirit  of their  view. After all,  stage theory is 
characterized  by  Sider  as  the  view that  stages  are  ‘the  referents  of  ordinary  terms, 
members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predication, and so 
on’.  (Sider,  2001,  p.  60-61).  If  we  adopt  the  idea  that  ‘Obama’  is  never  used 
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referentially,  we cannot maintain that stages are the referents  of ordinary terms and 
subjects of ordinary predication. And, of course, the strategy under consideration is also 
incompatible with Sider’s attractive account of ‘de re temporal predication’, which in 
turn plays a crucial role in his arguments for preferring stage theory over perdurantism 
(see Sider 1996, p. 450-1). Therefore, I think stage theorists are better off taking the 
alternative option: uttered today, both ‘Obama’ and ‘Socrates’ refer, and both (5) and (6) 
express singular propositions. 
In order to give this uniform treatment, PSV should be replaced by a view that allows 
proper names to refer to stages existing at times other than the time of utterance. My 
suggestion is that this should be done by preserving two orthodox views about proper 
names: first, the view that proper names are not context sensitive – that they refer to the 
same individual at each context of utterance – and second, that the referent of a name is 
the  individual  originally  baptized  with  it.  Putting  these  two  pieces  together  in 
combination with stage theory, we get what I call the  baptized-stage view (BSV): the 
referent of a proper name is the stage originally baptized with it. On this view, 'Obama'  
refers  to  a  1961  baby-shaped  stage  –  the  stage  originally  baptized  with  the  name. 
Surprisingly many things are true of this ‘baby stage’. This is because the properties 
ascribed by ordinary predicates are more complex than one might have initially thought 
– an idea to which,  as we shall  see,  the stage theorist is  already and independently 
committed. So for instance, when we say things like ‘In 2007 Obama was a senator 
from Illinois’, we are saying of the originally baptized stage that it has the property of 
having been a senator from Illinois in 2007. This property turns out to be, on analysis, 
the  property  of  being  such  as  to  have  a  temporal  counterpart  in  2007  which  is,  
simpliciter, a senator from Illinois.10  
10 An account like the one presented here is discussed but not endorsed by Moyer (2008). But 
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Before exploring the most problematic consequences of BSV, let me just mention some 
attractive features of it. First of all, it allows us to give a uniform treatment of pairs of 
sentences  like (5) and (6):  in  both sentences,  the function of the proper  name is  to 
contribute  a  particular  individual  about  which  a  singular  proposition  is  expressed. 
Second,  BSV allows names to have merely past and merely future referents. This is a 
natural view for four-dimensionalists (and for non-presentists in general) to hold. As we 
have seen, there is no apparent reason in this theoretical context to restrict reference to 
present entities. Third, BSV is relatively non-revisionary with respect to the semantics of 
proper names: it  preserves the two orthodox views mentioned above (names are not 
context-sensitive, a name refers to the thing originally baptized with it), and of course 
the ‘natural view’, as Donnellan calls it, that when using a name we are expressing a 
singular proposition about a particular entity rather than something general about the 
world.11 In these three respects, BSV is an improvement on Sider's qualified PSV. 
But  in  order  to  do  its  job  satisfactorily,  BSV has  to  be  further  developed  and 
complemented with auxiliary views about properties and temporal  predication.  Also, 
some natural objections have to be addressed. This is what I intend to do now. 
4.1 Temporal predication.
the reasons that motivate Moyer’s discussion are different from mine, and so are his overall  
conclusions.  As far  as  I  can see,  much of  Moyer’s  dissatisfaction  with the  present  account 
comes from rather general concerns about what he calls ‘Kripkean theories of reference’, and  
his preference for a descriptivist theory like Evans’. Although I am more optimistic than Moyer 
is about the general prospects of the Kripkean approach, this is not the place to engage in a 
general assessment of theories of reference. Instead, I will focus here on the specific problems  
that a non-descriptivist  account faces when combined with stage theory, trying to show how 
these problems can be overcome.
11 Donnellan (1974), p. 11.
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The standard counterpart-theoretic account of temporal predication tells us that x was F 
iff the referent of ‘x’ has a counterpart in the past that is  F simpliciter. So stated, this 
standard account is ambiguous, since ‘in the past’ may be understood in two different 
ways. The ambiguity is not problematic under the assumption of PSV, but it could be so 
if we adopt BSV instead. Given BSV, we should understand ‘in the past’ as meaning the 
past relative to the time of utterance, rather than the past relative to the time when the 
referent of ‘x’ exists.  So my utterance today of ‘Obama was once a college student’ is 
true iff the baby-stage baptized ‘Obama’ has a college student counterpart at any time 
before today  – not before the time of the baby-stage. On  PSV, the time of utterance 
always  coincides  with  the  time  where  the  referent  exists,  so  this  disambiguation  is 
unnecessary. 
Once the point is clarified, it does not represent any serious problem for BSV. It might 
seem at first sight odd that an object satisfies a past-tensed predicate (like ‘was once a 
college  student’)  in  virtue  of  events  that  lie  in  the  object’s  future.  But  there  is  an 
explanation  for  this  oddity:  the  past-directedness  of  the  predicate  flows  from  the 
speaker’s time, not from the time of the object satisfying the predicate.
4.2 Subject Matter. 
 A natural, immediate objection to BSV goes likes this: isn't it just implausible that when 
reporting the deeds and facts of Obama's life the name 'Obama' always refers to the 
originally  baptized,  baby-shaped  Obama-stage?  Aren't  we  talking  about  the  adult 
Obama-stages when we say that Obama was a senator from Illinois? If so, it seems as if 
the referent of the name should be among these adult stages. 
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The objection is based on the thought that it must be the case that we sometimes refer to 
adult Obama-stages. I grant that this is a very appealing thought and that its rejection is  
a counter-intuitive consequence of  BSV. But I want to make a couple of remarks that 
will make this consequence less unpalatable. My first remark is about what ‘counter-
intuitive’ means here.  Notice  that  the  thought  that  we sometimes refer  to  the  adult 
Obama-stages is not an intuition that ordinary speakers have. Their intuition is simply 
that we speak about Obama, and they express it in a language that makes no ‘explicit’ 
reference to stages – no reference to stages as such, be they adult-stages or baby-stages. 
So rejecting the thought that we sometimes refer to the adult Obama-stages is counter-
intuitive only from the theoretician’s point of view. 
But second, even if BSV rules out the adult Obama-stages as referents of ‘Obama’, these 
stages  are  not  completely  left  out  of  the  picture.  On  the  contrary,  they  very  often 
intervene in the story of why the things we say about Obama are true. That Obama was 
a  senator,  for  instance,  is  true  partly  because  an  adult  Obama-stage  is  a  senator 
simpliciter.  And  I  think  this  substitute  role  conferred  to  the  adult  Obama-stages 
alleviates some of the unease that we as theoreticians may feel about the thought that we  
never  refer to  them.  In any case,  let  me emphasize  that  this  ‘theoretically  counter-
intuitive’ consequence  of  BSV has  to  be  weighed  against  BSV’s main  theoretical 
benefits:  the  ability  to  treat  each  occurrence  of  ‘Obama’ as  a  genuine  referential 
expression with an invariant meaning – something on which PSV and the modified PSV 
fail, for some reason or other. 
4.3 Predicate meanings
A second immediate objection to BSV questions the plausibility of taking predicates to 
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have  the  apparently  deviant  meaning  that  they  must  have  in  order  for  them to  be 
satisfied by the relevant stages. In order for ‘was a senator’ to be satisfied by a baby 
Obama-stage, the predicate must have a much more complex meaning than one might 
intuitively  think,  one  involving  complex  relations  with  different  stages.  In  reply,  it 
should be noticed first that, in a way, the meaning of the predicate is not so complex: the  
predicate ‘was a senator’ still expresses the property of having been a senator, and the 
sentence ‘x was a senator’ is true if and only if the referent of ‘x’ has that property. What 
is more complex than one might have thought is the property of having been a senator, 
which on analysis turns out to be identical to the property of being such as to have a 
counterpart at a (contextually selected) past time that is a senator simpliciter. But more 
importantly, this kind of complexity is not unfamiliar for stage theorists. Stage theory is 
already committed to properties being more complex than naturally thought, in at least 
two respects. First,  according to  PSV,  properties attributed by temporal predications, 
like  the  property  having  been  a  senator,  already  involve  relations  to  temporal 
counterparts:  having been a senator is a property that the present Obama-stage has in 
virtue of the relations it bears to its past counterparts. On BSV, on the other hand, the 
property is had by the baptized Obama-stage in virtue of the relations it bears to exactly 
the  same  counterparts.  Thus,  the  difference  between  the  two  views  is  not  on  the 
complexity of the properties attributed.  Second, stage theorists are committed to the 
view that even many properties attributed by ordinary present-tense predications, like 
‘Obama drinks coffee’,  are very complex relational  properties.  Drinking coffee,  like 
most  things people  do,  takes  more  than an instant.  So if  the  property expressed by 
‘drinks coffee’ is had by an instantaneous thing, as stage theorists propose, it must be a 
very relational property that the things in question have in virtue of being related to 
other instantaneous things in the appropriate ways (cf. Sider 2001 p 197-8). In sum, 
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given  that  stage  theorists  are  already  committed  to  the  view  that  most  properties 
attributed in ordinary speech are highly relational properties, the complexity that results 
from adopting BSV does not imply any extra cost.
4.4. Baptism of non-present stages.12 
BSV tells us that the referent of a name is the stage originally baptized with that name. 
Thus, it is crucial for us to address the issue of what a baptism is, and what makes a  
given stage the baptized stage. By ‘baptism’ I mean the introduction of a name in the 
language, which typically involves some kind of ostension or description (or both). In 
many  cases,  as  with  ‘Obama’ and  the  other  examples  discussed  so  far,  the  object 
baptized exists at the time when the baptism takes place. In these cases, and leaving 
aside  the  fact  that  any  baptism  takes  more  than  an  instant,  it  is  not  especially 
problematic to determine what the baptized stage is: we may take it to be the stage 
existing at the time of baptism that satisfies the reference-fixing descriptions, or is the 
object of ostension. (The reason is that, in these cases, it is charitable to understand the 
baptizer as restricting the domain of quantification to what is present  at  the time of 
baptism). But we can also baptize things that are not present when the baptism takes 
place. To use Evans’ famous example, suppose that we introduce the name ‘Julius’ to 
designate whoever invented the zip. Since no present object satisfies this description (or 
so let us assume), we face in this case the question of determining the baptized. This 
question  is  especially  hard  because  ‘the  inventor  of  the  zip’ is,  according  to  stage 
theorists,  an  improper definite  description.  There  are  many  things  that  satisfy  the 
predicate ‘is the inventor of the zip’ – many stages, all of them in the past, that have the 
property of being the inventor of the zip. 
12 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for urging me to consider the problems discussed in 
this section.
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Before presenting what I take to be the best answer to this question, I want to briefly 
consider an alternative answer. A friend of BSV may follow the lead of Sider (2001) and 
qualify her confidence in the unrestricted truth of stage theory in the first place. Indeed, 
it is problems with quantificational phrases of the sort ‘the inventor of the zip’ that leads 
Sider  to  adopt  the  mixed  view  according  to  which  our  ordinary  domains  of 
quantification are sometimes constituted by worms rather than by stages.13 A defender of 
BSV who shares with Sider this tolerance for ambiguities could therefore say that in 
those cases of baptism in which there is no present stage satisfying the reference-fixing 
definite descriptions, the thing baptized is a worm rather than a stage. This would be a  
completely natural view for someone who, for congruent reasons, is already committed 
to restricting the scope of stage theory, like Sider (2001). Nevertheless, it would be good 
to have  a solution available  to  full-blown stage theorists  –  a  solution that  does  not 
require this partial abandonment of their theory. 
One  such  solution  consists  in  taking  the  reference  of  ‘Julius’ as  indeterminate in 
reference between the different inventors of the zip. That is to say, the friend of BSV is 
committed to the idea that the referent of ‘Julius’ is the stage baptized with that name –
the stage that satisfies the reference-fixing definite description. But if there is no  one 
single stage so baptized – no single inventor of the zip – he should conclude that the 
name  vaguely refers to each of the inventors of the zip. Each of them has an equally 
good claim to be the thing baptized and therefore the referent of ‘Julius’. In particular, 
none of them is ruled out by considerations about the intentions that the baptizer had 
when introducing the name: whereas it is clear is that the baptizer intended to pick one 
single referent for ‘Julius’, there is no particular stage that she intended to pick among 
13 See Sider (2001), p. 197.
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the several suitable candidates. So we may conclude that she succeeded in introducing a 
proper name, although she did not succeed in giving it a determinate meaning. 
Taking ‘Julius’ and the like as indeterminate in reference allows us to remain loyal to 
the idea that proper names always refer to stages:  the function of a proper name is 
nothing but the contribution of a stage to a singular proposition – only that it is vague 
which stage exactly is the one contributed. It also allows us to keep the advantages of 
BSV mentioned above: the resulting view is non-revisionary in that it takes names as 
having an invariant reference, and does not require the postulation of a mysterious shift 
in  the kind of contribution made by a  name when its referent  is  no longer around. 
Moreover, indeterminacy in singular reference is an already familiar phenomenon, and 
one that can be treated with the standard supervaluationist tools.  Consider the following 
example:
(7) Julius was smart.
According to  BSV, (7) is true iff the referent of ‘Julius’ has a counterpart prior to the 
time of utterance  that is  smart  simpliciter.  Now, on the version of  BSV that we are 
considering here, it is indeterminate what the referent of ‘Julius’ is. Every inventor of 
the  zip is  an acceptable  candidate.  But  applying here the  standard supervaluationist 
account, we obtain the following analysis: (7) is true iff every inventor of the zip has a 
counterpart  prior  to  the time of utterance that is  smart simpiciter.  It  is  important  to 
notice here that even if the supervaluationist analysis of (7) is captured by a general 
claim, we are still retaining the insight that the proposition expressed by (7) is a singular 
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proposition, and that the contribution of ‘Julius’ to this proposition is a single stage –
only that it is indeterminate which one. 
5. Conclusion.
My aim in this paper has been to present what I take to be the best picture about the  
semantics of proper names available to stage theorists. This is what I call the baptized-
stage view (BSV). I have argued that this view fares better than the present-stage view, 
and  the  qualified  present-stage  view  defended  by  Sider.  BSV has  some  surprising 
consequences: it implies that most proper names for humans refer to baby stages (4.2),  
and it implies that many proper names are indeterminate in reference (4.4.). But I have 
argued that these consequences are not as unpalatable as they may initially seem and 
that, in any case, they are outweighed by BSV’s main theoretical advantage: its ability, 
not  matched  by  the  competing  views,  to  treat  proper  names  as  genuine  referential 
expressions with an invariant meaning. Therefore, my central conclusion is that stage 
theorists are well advised to adopt BSV. 
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